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MR. KEYTE:

Good morning to part of the

world; good afternoon to another part of the world,
including our speakers.
As everybody may know, in the live
conference the heads of authority have their own
workshop and we do not really get a chance to ask
questions at the Fordham Conference of heads of
authority unless they are keynote speakers.

What we

thought we would do this year, with a virtual
conference, is have a Q&A session with some key heads
of authority around the world that will primarily be
for the audience.

In that regard, what we are going

to do is have fairly rapid opening thoughts; I will
ask a few questions, and then we will open it up to
the audience.
Very quick introductions, and I am doing it
alphabetically, not necessarily in order.

We have:

Andrea Coscelli, Chief Executive of the CMA — you
could wave, but everybody knows who you are; Isabelle
de Silva, President of the French Authority; Cani
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Fernández, President of the Spanish Authority; Olivier
Guersent, Director-General, DG Comp; Margarida Matos
Rosa, President, Portuguese Authority; Gabriella
Muscolo, Commissioner of the Italian Authority and a
longtime friend; and Christine Wilson, Commissioner of
the FTC, a colleague and sometimes opposing her in
private practice back in the day.
The general topics are: antitrust in times
of pandemic; are the tools for Big Tech right; and
where does sustainability fit in antitrust?

Certainly

you all should prepare questions that you may have,
try to keep them related to those topics. I am sure
there will be some others, but we will get to choose,
frankly.
Why don’t we start off with some quick
observations or comments from each of our excellent
panelists?

I don’t know if they have chosen an order,

or I could choose one for them.

Why don’t we just do

it alphabetically as well?
Andrea, why don’t you start?
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MR. COSCELLI:

Thanks, James.

Just a couple of thoughts from me on the
pandemic.

One of the things we did in March, when we

had the first wave in the United Kingdom, was to
launch a task force to work across the organization to
try to react very quickly to events, which we think
has been a fairly successful model for us.1
Essentially, our work focused on three areas.
One was to monitor prices and deal with lots
of complaints coming in about price increases for
things like face masks, hand sanitizers, or food
products.

We wrote lots of letters, we worked a lot

with trade associations, and opened a number of
targeted investigations in this area.
The second area was cooperation among
businesses.

We published very quickly some guidance

and then we worked closely with government to pass
legislation to allow for cooperation in a number of
key areas, like healthcare, groceries, and dairy.
Interestingly, some of these had sunset clauses, so
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some of these agreements had exclusions from this
agreement that ended in the last few weeks.
Finally, because we are also a consumer
protection authority, we have done a lot of work on
cancellations and refunds — or I should say lack of
refunds — by a number of businesses.

We have a number

of ongoing investigations and we have reached
settlements with a number of businesses to ensure that
they refunded the many, many consumers who suffered
during the first wave.
Unfortunately, it feels like there is the
beginning of a second wave in a number of places in
Europe, including the United Kingdom, so we might have
to go back and do a number of these things again in
the coming months.
Thanks.

That is what I want to say by way

of introduction, James.
MR. KEYTE:

Isabelle?

MS. de SILVA:

1

I want to say that this

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-cma-taskforce/cma-covid-19-taskforce
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period has been one that has taught us a lot in terms
of how to organize the workforce.

I think, like for

many private and public organizations, this was a big
challenge for us, and it also was very instructive to
see how we could organize working from home to
maintain our mission.
I would say that one of the priorities that
we had during this period was to maintain a steady
flow in terms of merger notifications and approvals.
We tried as much as possible not to delay merger
examinations and to maintain a rapid flow of
decisions.

This was quite a challenge for the teams,

but we maintained a steady flow of decisions.
In regard to the impact of the Covid-19
crisis on possible antitrust practices, I think, like
Andrea described for the CMA, we put in a lot of
effort in terms of trying to respond to questions from
the private sectors.

There were not that many

questions that were asked to the authority, maybe
because there is not a tradition that we easily answer
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any questions they may have about “Is that argument
compatible with antitrust law?”
We had one in which we gave an answer and we
publicized it.

The question was whether opticians

could decide together the way in which they would pay
their rent during the Covid-19 crisis.
In terms of antitrust practices, we set up a
Covid-19 task force to get as much information as
possible about possible infringements, and we did
receive quite a lot of information from the market
about possible abuses.
We also had one case that we dealt with in a
very speedy manner because it was in the French
office, an exclusivity conduct that might have
prevented some hospitals from receiving the materials
they needed to deal with Covid-19 patients.

This was

settled through a discussion with the company, and the
company was very proactive in terms of ceasing to
practice this exclusivity, so this was settled in a
matter of days.
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This was what I wanted to say for my opening
remarks.
MR. KEYTE:

Cani?

MS. FERNÁNDEZ:
you so much.

Hello to everyone and thank

I am very happy to be here with all of

you.
In fact, I would like to transmit three
ideas in my opening remarks: how we dealt with
treating the pandemic internally; what we did at the
national level; and what we were doing at the
international level?
Internally, as for everybody, the shock was
immediate.

From one day to the following we had a

state of alarm declared, so people had to work from
home from one day to the following.
remarkably well.

It has worked

We are still teleworking.

We have

postponed coming back to work because the situation in
Madrid and in Barcelona, because we have two
headquarters, is uncertain.
teleworking with no problem.

So we are still
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Everybody, including the board, was meeting
through teams, and it worked very well.

In areas

where duty required presence, we were organizing some
work shifts so that people could telework or work in
person.
At the national level, what did we do for
consumers and users?
The first thing we did was to organize a
specific mailbox for complaints regarding any
antitrust or competition infringement related to
Covid-19, and there were over 700 complaints that we
were dealing with in different areas, as you can
imagine.

Sanitary products was one.

Another one was

private insurance in order to cover treatment in
public or private hospitals.

Also we had in the

funerary sector some cases that were extremely sad.
One area in which we are still investigating
is the financial sector, where some of the loans that
were granted with a guaranty of the state were linked
to other products like insurance or alarm services or
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others, and we are still investigating that.
Apart from that, we were also issuing some
guidance in cooperation agreements.

We did that in

several areas as well and it worked well.

All of our

answers were given in fewer than ten days, and we were
doing that in accordance with the guidance received
from the European Commission.

Olivier will be able to

tell us more about that.
Internationally, we were cooperating with
other authorities that were having similar problems to
ours, and we were trying to exchange views and help
each other in understanding how to approach issues
that we were having in a similar way.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you very much.

Olivier, you happen to also fall
alphabetically in the right spot, given the reference
from Cani.
MR. GUERSENT:

Thank you, James.

Very quickly, before the Covid-19 crisis, my
view is that competition policy was already confronted
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with a number of long-term challenges — digitization,
globalization, and climate change.

At least for the

European Commission these were the three big ones.

Of

course, the Covid-19 crisis added a number of shortterm challenges to that, at the same time as it shrank
the lead time we have to adapt to the longer-term
challenges as well.

It made everything more pressing.

We have maybe a specificity in the
Commission as we have the pleasure to deal with
antitrust and mergers, as do all of our colleagues,
and we have the even greater pleasure to deal with
state aid (state subsidies) and of course when facing
such a crisis this becomes quite a crucial instrument,
so it took quite a lot of our time.
When we moved to an emergency response, we
had all of the organizational challenges that Cani
just referred to — and that all of us had to face,
like many, many other organizations and companies.
The first thing to do, was the emergency
response.

In state aid that meant authorizing quite
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large amounts of money to be put into the economy in
Europe while trying to preserve the integrity of the
single market. This is because, of course the fiscal
capacity of the various Member States is quite
different and the potential for fragmentation of
diverging responses is therefore quite big.
In antitrust — I think Andrea referred to it
— we have authorized quite unusual cooperation we
would probably never have authorized in normal times.
I signed the first comfort letter for the last sixteen
years I think in the European Commission, to allow the
European manufacturers of generic medicines for
intensive care units to step up their production in
order to increase their output, which is a typical
allocation of production behavior that we would
normally prohibit.

In that case we actually helped

organize it so as not to create permanent damage, in
the sense that we organized it in a way that the
various participants didn’t have access to each
other’s data.
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I think the next challenge will be: How do
we move from emergency response to accompanying the
recovery while keeping in mind the longer-term
challenges that I alluded to at the beginning.

For us

at least, that will be the next challenge and that
will require a careful calibration of competition
policy.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you, Olivier.

Margarida?
MS. MATOS ROSA:

Hello to everyone joining

us today and to my fellow panel members, and, James,
hello to you as well.
Given what has been said so far, I think I
might as well share some of what has been keeping us
busy in terms of current times but also in the short
and medium run.
I would like to say we see these times as
important times and an opportunity to put our best
efforts into seeing antitrust policy embedded in other
policies.
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We know that policymakers have been
extremely busy focusing on health issues, on the
economy, on social and labor policies, and rightly so,
but without competition policy underlying other
policies, that focus can have a cost and that cost may
slow down progress in those same policies.

We see

this as a risk that can be materialized if we relax
competition rules.
If you shield markets from competitive
pressure and if you relax current rules to a big
extent, then you may end up with less innovation, with
higher prices, with less consumption, and therefore
with slower economic growth.

We as a society all have

an interest in ensuring that competition policy
becomes one of the pillars of the economic recovery in
the short and in the medium run.
For this to occur, I think we all — as an
antitrust community of enforcers but also of lawyers
and academia — must reach out beyond our comfort zone,
beyond our inner circle — present here today I have no
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doubt — and we must be more eloquent about the
positive role of competition policy.

I will leave it

here for now.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you, Margarida.

Gabriella?
MS. MUSCOLO:

Thank you, James.

Good morning, good afternoon, good evening,
everybody.

I am delighted to take part in this

meeting again, although I would have liked more to be
with you in person in New York.
We are all living in a time of profound
disruption which will impact our countries
economically and socially.
First of all, the impact of the Covid-19
outbreak on sustainable development and competition
puts national competition authorities in a situation
where they must rethink the consumer welfare standard
by taking into account new elements not necessarilyy
with regard to prices and quantities, such as quality
and innovation perhaps.

16

Second, these changes should find a
practical application into the legal tools at our
disposal.
Third, we should start by putting more
emphasis on tools capable of entitling decision
makers, such as the national competition authorities,
to interact with policymakers in a procompetitive
manner.
Advocacy represents a flexible instrument to
deal with new truths.

Through this tool, the Italian

Competition Authority interacts with policymakers and,
by applying the principle of proportionality, the
Authority is able to strike a balance between
competition and other policy goals and to soften the
actual conflict between antitrust policies and
industrial policies.
In more detail, how has the Covid-19
outbreak changed our way of operating?

The Italian

Competition Authority has decided not to create a
specific task force to cope with the emergency
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situation.

Indeed, the Authority’s decision has been

that each division will continue its enforcement
activity related to other issues.

However, the

interaction between the Consumer Protection Division
and the Antitrust Division has intensified, and the
Authority has decided to review its priorities
regarding intervention in light of the extraordinary
situation.
Moreover, in order to face possible
essential products shortages during the Covid-19
outbreak, the Italian Competition Authority published
a Communication on Cooperation Agreements in the
Covid-19 Emergency, which was in line with the one
published by the European Commission in April 2020.
I will stop here.

Thank you for your

attention.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

We will go to Christine, who for her entire
life has dreaded the phrase “let’s go in alphabetical
order.”
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MS. WILSON:
James.

Only since I got married,

I was Christine Bravery before I got married,

so I was slightly further up in the alphabet.
In any event, it is a pleasure to be here.
Fordham always hosts a wonderful event, and I am sorry
that we cannot be together in person, but it is
delightful to be here on this panel with some of my
favorite colleagues.
I am going to talk about one of the other
topics that James has chosen for today’s panel.

I

would like to share some breaking news. The House of
Representatives in the United States Congress has been
conducting an investigation into the tech arena for
the last year and a half, and they finally issued
their long-awaited report. Last night it landed.
To be precise, this is a report of the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress.
They had conducted a series of hearings examining
online platforms and market power, and last night the
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report when it was issued totaled 449 pages with 2540
footnotes.

I have read a chunk of it, focusing on the

Executive Summary and on the Recommendations.

I am

still making my way through the rest of it. I am sure
we will have an opportunity to talk a bit more about
it, but I have some cause for concern regarding some
of the recommendations and look forward to talking
about that.
I want to emphasize for our international
audience that this report does not mean that the
antitrust laws in the United States are changing
today.

This is a report from the majority of a

subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in the House
of Representatives in the United States Congress.
They have signaled that they are thinking about
introducing legislation in the coming months, but
until new laws are passed the laws will remain the
same.
While the House Judiciary Committee was
working on this report, the Federal Trade Commission
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and the Department of Justice and the state attorneys
general in the United States have also been incredibly
busy on this front.

I want to just highlight some of

the activities of the Federal Trade Commission.
As many of you know, we held hearings in
2018 and 2019 to examine whether new technologies and
evolving business practices might require adjustments
to competition law and policy.

We created the

Technology Enforcement Division within the Bureau of
Competition to address markets in which digital
technology is an important dimension of competition.
It has been widely reported that both DOJ
and the FTC have ongoing investigations of digital
platform companies, and it has been publicly announced
that we are conducting what is called a 6(b) study, a
market study, on acquisitions that have been made by
Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft that
did not meet the requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing regime and so were not prenotified to the FTC
and DOJ, and this study will help us determine whether
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there are potentially anticompetitive acquisitions of
nascent or potential competitors that are flying under
our radar.
Obviously, as all of my colleagues
discussed, tech is getting a lot of headlines, but
healthcare matters are of significant focus during the
pandemic, and I am sure we will be talking more about
that as well.
Before I wrap up, let me just say with
respect to the current time in which we are operating
that my colleagues at the FTC and I moved to telework
in March.

We are still essentially 100 percent on

telework, and I am blown away every day by the
commitment and professionalism and dedication of the
FTC staff who continue under suboptimal circumstances
to do incredibly excellent work and it is my privilege
to work with them.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you, Christine.

I will ask a few questions to start.

I will

ask everybody who has a view to give me very short
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answers, which may be difficult, and then we will have
some time for some other questions from the audience
at the end.
Let me stay with tech first.

Let me ask if

anybody has a strong view on whether the challenges of
Big Tech multisided platforms should be one for the
courts in an iterative process or should it be one for
legislation?

Have at it.

Olivier?
MR. GUERSENT:

I would say both from a

European perspective.
What have we seen in the recent past?

We

have seen that these markets are tipping markets with
very powerful network effects.

At the same time, they

are very complex markets for which you need to crunch
incredible amounts of data to simply establish the
facts and prove the case.

Of course, rights of

defense and processual rights are rightly there to
protect everybody, but all this takes time.

The

problem we have is that there is a discrepancy between
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the speed of the investigation and the speed at which
undesirable effects spread in the market, and
sometimes you are able to prove your case so late that
the effects are irremediable.
I think, on the one hand, you could
legislate because there are a number of behaviors
that, at least in Europe, have been proven harmful
repeatedly when put into effect by very large
platforms.

You could say, “Well, listen guys, if you

are in that box and if you are doing one of these
behaviors, it is prohibited, or it is prohibited
unless you can prove it is beneficial,” for example.
That, I think, would require, at least in Europe,
legislation.

We cannot do it with existing antitrust

tools.
But of course, for the traditional Article
101 and 102 antitrust cases, the courts will continue
to have a very, very strong role to play because we
will continue to enforce Articles 101 and 102 of the
Treaty very forcefully in the future as well.
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Clearly, the courts will also have a role to play, in
the frame of the new instruments I just referred to,
if we ever forge them.
So both really.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

Any other strong and short views, Andrea?
MR. COSCELLI:

Yes.

I agree with Olivier.

I think if you look at the financial market, to me it
is a relevant comparison, where you have quite a lot
of extra regulation in place because of the
persistence of some of the behaviors that worried us
over the last ten or fifteen years, but you still have
strong antitrust enforcement in some areas.

So, the

courts will always play a role certainly in antitrust
and certainly on any sort of regulatory framework that
is added to it.
I think there is an issue of speed.

There

is an issue also of case law in antitrust, which
obviously is interpreted as the way that they test
your view and the burden of proof on agencies, which
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is linked to a number of historic tech cases, so there
is very strong documentary evidence, very strong
evidence of historical behavior.

I think the issue

with a number of these tech cases is their fast-moving
nature, their complexity, and the fact that the
evidence keeps moving in a way, so you are trying to
deal with a moving target.
We are very much in the same place.

We are

advising the government in the United Kingdom that we
need more regulation alongside our existing work using
our current toolkit.
MS. WILSON:

James, if I can hop in for a

minute.
MR. KEYTE:
MS. WILSON:

Yes, sure.
Obviously, Big Tech is a

significant focus of concern — and we are not just
talking about antitrust concerns; people have concerns
about privacy and about data security and they have
concerns in the United States about Section 230 and
content moderation and harmful content posted online,
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in addition to the competition concerns that we have.
So when you ask, “Is regulation appropriate or do we
leave this to the courts?,” I would say in some areas
I do believe that new laws would be helpful.
The Federal Trade Commission, on a
bipartisan basis for probably fifteen or twenty years
now, has asked the Congress in the United States to
pass comprehensive federal privacy legislation and
data security legislation.

I think that if there had

been limits on the kinds of information that could be
collected and how that information could be shared and
used and monetized, we may see a different competitive
landscape.
I have taken again this opportunity to
encourage Congress to pass federal privacy
legislation.

It would be great to see data security

legislation, and it would be great for the United
States to figure out how it wants to deal with
revisions to Section 230.
That said, I believe that on the competition
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front the tools that we have and the case law that we
have are fit for the purpose.

I do not believe that

we need new laws in the antitrust arena — and perhaps
we will talk a bit more about that — but my view now
is that case law, for the most part, is headed in the
right direction and giving us the answers we need that
will maximize consumer welfare.
MR. KEYTE:

Great.

I am going to direct the next question to
those who have not taken on a question yet, and focus
on abusive pricing — something that, of course, in the
United States some would say is not encompassed by the
laws there, and I know there are difficult standards
to meet in the Member States in the European Union —
and then you put on top of that the pandemic.
Addressing the rest of the panel, how do you
deal with abusive pricing in a time of pandemic, where
even some of the pricing may not be viewed as being by
dominant firms may still be viewed as abusive in a
sense?

Have you had to make any adjustments in those
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standards or how you review that? And then maybe,
Christine, you could comment at the end about whether
it has had any impact on the thinking in the United
States, given the law.
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:

Let me start because we did

have some situations in Spain in which we were
confronted during the pandemic with several episodes
of excessive pricing and our Ministry of Consumer
Protection had to react.

They were imposing some caps

for certain products, in particular health masks and
hydro-alcoholic gels.
We were being consulted.
some guidance.

We were providing

We were taking care that it was a very

short measure, that it was proportionate, that it was
really just to stop a particular situation, but I
believe that, with the exception of these very
specific elements of crisis or procedures of crisis,
we should be vigilant more in trying to avoid barriers
to entry than fixing prices themselves.

If needed,

you can go, but it has to be short and proportionate
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in my view, and of course for reasons of general
interest.
MR. KEYTE:

Isabelle or Margarida?

MS. de SILVA:

Yes, thank you, James.

The question of price is quite interesting
when you look at the choices that were made by France.
In France one of the reactions to the pandemic was to
adopt a great number of specific laws and decrees
regarding this sanitary crisis, and the choice was
made to put a general cap on prices of hydro-alcoholic
solution and protective equipment.

This had the

effect that all vendors decided to apply the maximum
price set by the government, but the government
decided when the emergency period came to an end this
summer in France to do away with those price caps.
We had two months of practical unique prices
in France and now we are again with prices that
compete against each other.

I think that for the

economic analysis it would be quite interesting to see
a real effect of price cap on the market and the pros
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and cons.
This means that we did not have that much
action in terms of abusive prices, so this was more
dealt with by the agency in charge of protecting the
consumer against fraud or products that were sold with
abusive prices regarding consumer protection.

In our

agency so far we did not have that much demand in that
respect.
MR. KEYTE:

I am going to move on to another

topic. I think Gabriella and Margarida may have been
ready for this, but there are some interesting
questions coming in.
One question that is a combination of what
is coming in and some thoughts I have had for
Gabriella, given your background in intellectual
property as a judge for so long, is: How do you give
good ex ante advice, advice in advance, for businesses
that are in the platform space and have intellectual
property rights?

How do they get guided by the

agencies when in fact they often do not know what is
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going to be challenged or scrutinized until much
later, after the behavior has been in the marketplace?
MS. MUSCOLO:
question.

Thank you, James, for your

It a very tricky one.
The Italian Competition Authority advocates

for competition, but advocacy is directed to public
administration and not to stakeholders.

Furthermore,

we have not had advocacy cases until now on dealing
with the interplay between IP and competition.
MR. KEYTE:

Margarida?

MS. MATOS ROSA:

Let me say I agree with

what Christine was saying before, in the sense that
there is a lot of legislation around consumer
protection that still needs to be fully implemented
and used before we quickly jump to the conclusion that
we need to change our legislation in terms of
competition policy.
Competition policy amendments may also be
required, but I believe that consumer protection has a
lot of laws on privacy, especially in Europe, that can
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be fully used to the benefit of consumers.
This leads me to say that we are not in the
consumer protection business as an agency, but we do
several things.

We can provide guidance to individual

companies that request our guidance if they are in
difficulties in assessing what they should do — of
course, not always; more in the pandemic period than,
generally speaking, in other periods of time.
But when we did our assessments in a sector
inquiry on e-commerce, on the use of algorithms, on
basically the different business models that are used
by platforms, we did come up with one conclusion and
one recommendation to companies, which was that
companies are responsible for the algorithms they use.2
Of course, this only responds to the collusion side,
not to the other sides of the discussion, but at least
we came up with that conclusion and that
recommendation, that companies are responsible for the

See AdC’s Issues Paper on “Digital ecosystems, Big Data and Algorithms” (2019) available at
http://www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Estudos_e_Publicacoes/Estudos_Economicos/Outros/Documents
/Digital%20Ecosystems,%20Big%20Data%20and%20Algorithms%20-%20Issues%20Paper.pdf.
Executive summary available at
2
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algorithms they choose and for the outcomes that these
algorithms may grant them.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

We just have a few minutes left.

What I

would like everybody to comment on very quickly, if
you have a view, is whether in the age of Big Tech and
digital economies around the world, do you think the
consumer welfare standard needs to change, needs to
evolve, or is it still just fine?
Why don’t we go in reverse-alphabetical
order, if that’s okay, starting with Christine.
MS. WILSON:

Absolutely.

I do have a view.

I believe that the

consumer welfare standard, which is currently the
touchstone of antitrust enforcement in the United
States and in many other jurisdictions, is incredibly
flexible.

We take into account price and cost and

choice and quality and output and innovation.

In

fact, between 2004 and 2014 more than 160 cases were

http://www.concorrencia.pt/vEN/Estudos_e_Publicacoes/Estudos_Economicos/Other/Documents/
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challenged by the Federal Trade Commission, and in
almost half of them we had a claim regarding
suppression or diminution of innovation.
There are those who say that the consumer
welfare standard is only about short-run price and
output, and I would ask them to look at the kinds of
cases that the agencies have been bringing for a very
long time, and I would submit to you that in fact
innovation is a significant part of what we do.
Though I believe here in the United States
we have the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which
have broad flexible standards, their application is
informed by the consumer welfare standard, which
focuses on the benefits of consumers without diluting
by focusing on other goals, including sustainability,
except as a nonprice aspect of competition —
sustainability could be one; privacy could be one.

I

would submit to you that that is what is going to
deliver the greatest benefits to consumers in both the
short and long runs.

Digital%20Ecosystems%20Executive%20Summary.pdf
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MR. KEYTE:

Given our time, I will probably

ask everybody to say, first, do you agree with
everything Christine says, which I think it was very
well said, and then we can get your very quick views,
starting, going in reverse order, with Gabriella.
MS. MUSCOLO:

Thank you, James.

Before the Covid-19 outbreak, there was
already an ongoing debate on competition,
sustainability, and consumer welfare.

Covid-19 has

only enhanced the debate in relation to the healthcare
sector, in my opinion without adding anything new to
the theoretical framework.
Indeed, do you remember, James, last year
during the Fordham Antitrust Workshop with Scott
Hemphill and Tim Wu we were discussing whether the
consumer welfare standard approach could be considered
a significant step forward for antitrust policies?
have already mentioned the changes in the consumer
welfare notion in my opening statement.
Let me close on a last point.

In this

I
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context, I believe that we should take into account
how competition law reacted after the 2007–2008
financial crisis.

Competition should not be

restricted in the name of other public interests —
such as financial stability, for instance — because in
the medium to long term it could harm consumers even
more.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

Margarida?
MS. MATOS ROSA:

I believe the scope of

competition analysis can be kept pretty much the same.
This, of course, does not mean that we cannot add
other perspectives into areas — such as State Aid, for
example, if we want to talk about sustainability,
which is one of the big topics right now — but, in
general, the interplay with other policies can be
taken into account but mildly and only in some
particular aspects of competition enforcement.

In

general, I would keep pretty much the scope that we
have and leave other aspects to other decision makers.
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MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

Olivier?
MR. GUERSENT:

I can be quick because I

fully agree with everything Christine said, with just
one clarification.
At the end of the day, it all depends on two
things.

First, how narrowly do you define consumer

welfare — and I fully agree on price, non-price,
innovation, and all this.

The second thing is, do you

need the same constituency of consumers that suffer a
price increase or other reduction of welfare also to
be the one that benefits?

I think these are the two

defining questions.
Otherwise consumer welfare can accommodate,
for example, externalities like decarbonization of the
economy, etc., very well I think.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

Isabelle?
MS. de SILVA:

Thank you.

I do fully agree with what Christine,
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Olivier, and my other colleagues have said.
Three years ago there was a debate about
whether the innovation theory that the Commission had
taken into account in Dow/Du Pont and Bio/Monsanto was
something that was completely new or was it something
that had always been there in terms of what type of
criteria you look at when you do a merger analysis. I
completely agree with what Christine has said, that
innovation and quality are really at the heart of what
we look at in an antitrust analysis.
I think today the debate is more focused for
enforcers about new tools, new ways to approach merger
or antitrust analysis, and I would like to give some
example if we have time.
I think the debate in Europe about the
Digital Services Act and the New Competition Tool
shows that we are looking at additional tools to those
we already have to deal with digital platforms or to
deal with other types of competitive issues.

So the

debate is really about something additional to merger
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approval or infringement procedures, and that is
really interesting.
Also, when we look at mergers, the recent
announcement by the Commission and Margrethe Vestager
that she was willing to consider having a new look at
mergers that were below the mandatory threshold
through a referral system to the Commission by
national competition agencies is a very good example
of looking at how the procedures can catch all the
competitive issues or cases we want to look at and we
do not need to change the criteria or the general
analytical framework.

This is what I believe in.

The debate is more about speed,
effectiveness, and covering all the different issues
we want to cover.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you.

Cani?
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:

I will be brief.

To answer

the question shortly, yes, I do believe that the
consumer welfare standard is the one that we have to
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move forward.
But there are many other areas in which
regulation is coming in order to try to fill some gaps
that we believe we have, and sometimes these may have
a problem of collusion in itself, colliding with other
objectives.

I will use an example that is in my view

quite worrisome.
We all believe that privacy is something
that in order to protect the consumer it has to be
there, and in Europe and elsewhere nowadays we are
very vigilant in trying to keep privacy and regulation
in order to protect privacy.

But now it seems that

some big players or some dominant players are using
this regulation as a strategic barrier to entry in
order not to share data, which is a clear competitive
parameter nowadays.
My only warning is, yes, let’s go for
regulation whenever it’s needed, let’s go to protect
consumers, but never forget that consumer welfare is
always at the end of the day the driver for
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competition always.

So be very vigilant in not over-

regulating with the progress that we may face.
MR. KEYTE:

Very well said.

Andrea, the last word.
MR. COSCELLI:

I will disagree a bit.

I

will make two points.
On the first one, in terms of whether
consumer welfare is wide enough, I am reasonably
comfortable that for us as an agency we are
interpreting it in the right way.

But most of our

relevant decisions go through litigation and through
the courts, so the question of whether the courts
interpret consumer welfare in a sufficiently wide
manner is a very relevant one for me.
I think you picked the three right topics in
terms of challenges today for competition authorities
worldwide:

Obviously Big Tech, the fact that a number

of people think we have been slow to act in that
space; obviously the very significant dislocation of
our economies and what is going to happen post-Covid-
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19; and sustainability.

I think personally the jury

is very much out whether over the next few years in
these three areas the majority of voters in each of
our countries will regard the competition authorities
being on the right side of the arguments.
If you take a slightly historical
perspective, the mandate and the importance of
competition authorities has gone up and down over the
years and the decades.

Personally, I think we cannot

really be complacent.
This debate about consumer welfare for me is
very much about whether we are relevant, whether we
will remain relevant, and whether among various policy
instruments that are available through our
parliaments, antitrust and competition policy remain
one of the key ones.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you so much, and thank you

to the panel.
Next year, hopefully when we see each other
live, we will be able to have some version of this
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format because I think it is very, very informative,
we get a lot of perspectives.

But we shall see.

Again, thank you all very much.

